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SUMMARY
Animal health surveillance enables the detection and control of animal diseases including zoonoses.
Under the EU-FP7 project RISKSUR, a survey was conducted in 11 EU Member States and
Switzerland to describe active surveillance components in 2011 managed by the public or private
sector and identify gaps and opportunities. Information was collected about hazard, target
population, geographical focus, legal obligation, management, surveillance design, risk-based
sampling, and multi-hazard surveillance. Two countries were excluded due to incompleteness of
data. Most of the 664 components targeted cattle (26·7%), pigs (17·5%) or poultry (16·0%). The
most common surveillance objectives were demonstrating freedom from disease (43·8%) and case
detection (26·8%). Over half of components applied risk-based sampling (57·1%), but mainly
focused on a single population stratum (targeted risk-based) rather than differentiating between
risk levels of different strata (stratiﬁed risk-based). About a third of components were multi-hazard
(37·3%). Both risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance were used more frequently in
privately funded components. The study identiﬁed several gaps (e.g. lack of systematic
documentation, inconsistent application of terminology) and opportunities (e.g. stratiﬁed risk-
based sampling). The greater ﬂexibility provided by the new EU Animal Health Law means that
systematic evaluation of surveillance alternatives will be required to optimize cost-effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
Animal health surveillance (AHS) forms a key elem-
ent in detecting and controlling animal and zoonotic
diseases, demonstrating disease freedom to ensure
safe trade and providing valuable data for decision
support [1]. A key feature of surveillance is the
need for the systematic (continuous or repeated)
measurement, collection, collation, analysis, inter-
pretation, and timely dissemination of data [2].
Hence, single surveys or analytical studies do not
fall under this surveillance deﬁnition. The need for
systematic analysis and interpretation arises from
the close link between surveillance and intervention
strategies in case undesired changes are observed
[3], which distinguishes surveillance from monitoring
systems. Monitoring, i.e. the collection of animal
health data without a clear related action plan, usu-
ally only applies when the aim is to assess the initial
health status of a population, while otherwise data
collection without a clear related action plan should
not be encouraged [4]. In contrast to passive surveil-
lance, which relies on the detection and reporting of
clinical signs, active surveillance is initiated by the
investigator using a deﬁned protocol to perform
actions that are scheduled in advance [2]. While pub-
lic health surveillance commonly relies on notiﬁable
disease reporting (passive surveillance) and the ana-
lysis of secondary data, AHS places stronger
emphasis on collecting primary data via active sur-
veillance for example to fulﬁl trade requirements
and ensure food safety.
In the European Union (EU) AHS is regulated by
the Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP),
which aims to reduce the negative impact of animal
diseases on animal and public health, animal welfare,
and the economy by ensuring safe intra-community
trade with live animals and animal products [5].
Historically, the CAHP included almost 50 basic
directives and regulations and 400 pieces of secondary
legislation, most of which were adopted between 1988
and 1995 [1]. An external evaluation launched by the
Commission in 2004 to assess the performance of the
CAHP concluded that it lacks an overall strategy,
places insufﬁcient focus on disease prevention and
does not provide enough ﬂexibility to adapt new scien-
tiﬁc and technological developments. Audit reports
also indicated different interpretations of requirements
e.g. regarding speciﬁcations of risk categories as part
of the multi-annual national control plan, resulting
in diverse surveillance approaches taken by Member
States [6]. The new EU Animal Health Law published
in March 2016 [7] is based on the EU Animal Health
Strategy ‘Prevention is better than cure’ [5] and
streamlines the huge number of legal acts into a single
law, which shall also prevent piecemeal and crisis-
driven policy development in the future [1]. Besides
EU regulations, national and regional requirements
as well as private initiatives exist, which vary between
countries. Hence, the surveillance landscape in the EU
includes a mixture of regulated and non-regulated
activities managed by the public sector, private sector
or both.
Given budget limitations, it is crucial to carefully
design and regularly evaluate surveillance systems to
optimize cost-effectiveness. Traditionally, input-based
standards were applied, which required speciﬁc activ-
ities to be carried out regardless of the characteristics
of the population. In recent years, considerable pro-
gress has been made regarding surveillance design.
Alternative approaches include the application of
output-based standards [8, 9], where surveillance is
designed to meet deﬁned requirements (surveillance
sensitivity, design prevalence), thus supporting ﬂexible
approaches targeted to the characteristics of the popu-
lation under surveillance and the available capacities.
Two probabilistic output-based measures are applied,
i.e. the probability (‘conﬁdence’) of detecting a case
(surveillance sensitivity) and the probability that a
population is free from disease (negative predictive
value) [8]. While surveillance sensitivity allows achiev-
ing the targeted probability at the set design prevalence
for different testing regimes, sample sizes and risk
strata, the negative predictive value provides opportun-
ities to combine information from multiple surveillance
components and to take the value of historical informa-
tion into account [8, 10, 11]. Consequently, heterogen-
eity in populations can be more adequately accounted
for including various risk levels [9], and surveillance
effectiveness can be quantiﬁed in populations that are
too small to achieve the desired probability of detection
when applying input-based standards [10–12]. Hence,
these probabilistic approaches offer opportunities to
lower costs while achieving the same target or achieve
greater effectiveness at the same cost. Various analyses
have been published demonstrating the superiority of
output-based over input-based standards or risk-based
over random sampling strategies. For instance, it was
estimated that risk-based strategies reduced the cost
to demonstrate freedom from infectious bovine rhino-
traecheitis and enzootic bovine leucosis in the EU
between 2002 and 2009 by six million Euros [13].
Output-based standards have been evaluated for
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example for Trichinella spp. [14], bovine herpes virus 1
[15], avian inﬂuenza virus [16], transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathies [17, 18], Mycobacterium bovis
subsp. tuberculosis [19–22], Mycobacterium avium
subsp. paratuberculosis [11, 23, 24], classical swine
fever virus [25], bluetongue disease virus [26], and
resistant pathogens [27]. However, output-based
approaches need to be based on sound epidemiological
knowledge including an evaluation of the epidemio-
logical situation in the region, require close collabor-
ation and exchange between scientists and policy
makers [13] and need to be documented in a transpar-
ent manner to allow cross-country comparisons [28].
For early detection (or early warning surveillance),
alternative approaches include for example sentinel,
participatory and syndromic surveillance strategies
[29]. Syndromic surveillance can be deﬁned as ‘surveil-
lance of health indicators and diseases in deﬁned
populations in order to increase the likelihood of timely
detection of undeﬁned (new) or unexpected (exotic or
re-emerging) threats’ [2]. By detecting a disease early,
potential devastating consequences of spread and thus
economic impacts can be considerably minimised [28,
30]. Testing the same samples simultaneously for mul-
tiple hazards (multi-hazard surveillance) presents a gen-
eral option to reduce surveillance costs and thus
provides an important alternative to consider compared
to targeting a single hazard only.
Although these approaches are increasingly pro-
moted in scientiﬁc research, there is a lack of overview
of AHS activities in EU countries and to what extent
alternative strategies are already in place. Therefore,
as part of the EU-FP7 RISKSUR project (2012–
2015) (http://www.fp7-risksur.eu/), a survey was car-
ried out to describe existing surveillance activities in
EU countries, with the aim to identify gaps and
opportunities. Furthermore, a better understanding
of existing surveillance activities and differences
between countries also contributed to inform the
development of decision support tools for the design
and evaluation of surveillance systems (http://webt
ools.fp7-risksur.eu/).
METHODS
Survey design
The reference year was 2011 as this was the latest
reporting period for which expenditures were access-
ible at the time of data collection (spring to autumn
2013). All seven ‘partner countries’ (France, FR;
Germany, DE; Spain, ES; Sweden, SE; Switzerland,
CH; The Netherlands, NL; United Kingdom, UK) of
theRISKSURConsortiumaswell asﬁve selected ‘non-
partner countries’ (Bulgaria, BG; Czech Republic,
CZ; Denmark, DK; Ireland, IE; Italy, IT) were
included in the data collection process (subsequently
referred to as study countries). Non-partner countries
had been selected based on dissimilarity to partner
countries regarding geographical region (i.e. targeting
countries from Eastern and Southern Europe) and
animal populations, production systems and hazards
present, as well as the availability of a responsive
ofﬁcial contact person. Furthermore, an in-country
contact person had to be available to support data col-
lection, especially due to language barriers and insufﬁ-
cient publicly accessible information on surveillance
components, which would not have allowed for data
collection otherwise.
Sequential numbers were randomly assigned to
countries to preserve conﬁdentiality. All hazards
(e.g. pathogens, syndromes, antimicrobial resistance,
animal welfare) and species were covered, regardless
of whether surveillance was managed by the public
or private sector. Surveillance associated with import
or export testing was not considered as requirements
depend on the trading partners of the respective coun-
try. Even though data were collected on active and
passive components, only active surveillance compo-
nents were considered in this analysis as data on pas-
sive surveillance were considered to be too similar
between countries.
Questionnaire design
A questionnaire, comprising two sections with a total of
26 variables, was designed to collect information on sur-
veillance components (see Supplementary Section S1 for
a copy of the questionnaire and Supplementary
Table S1 for examples). A surveillance component was
deﬁned as a single surveillance activity used to investi-
gate the occurrence of one or more hazards or health
events in a speciﬁed population, which has a self-
contained (i.e. conclusive and comprehensive in itself)
surveillance protocol that focusses on a particular data
source. The following key variables were used for ana-
lysis: targeted threat, disease or health event, target
population, species and sector(s), geographical focus
(local, national or regional), primary purpose, legal obli-
gation, management (private, public or both), descrip-
tion of the component, study design (e.g. survey,
continuous data collection), case deﬁnition (e.g.
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laboratory test for pathogen/toxins or host response,
clinical signs, pathology, indirect indicators), risk-based
sampling, and multi-hazard surveillance. Cost informa-
tion is not presented in this paper as data gaps were too
large to make meaningful inferences. Risk-based sam-
pling was deﬁned as ‘preferentially sampling strata
within the target population that are more likely to be
exposed, affected, detected, become affected, transmit
infection, or cause other consequences’ [4]. For risk-
based components, a post-hoc distinction was further
made between targeted risk-based (focusing only on
one sub-stratum of the population) and stratiﬁed risk-
based (sampling intensity differs between population
strata). Multi-hazard surveillance was deﬁned as ‘sur-
veillance activities where samples collected for one dis-
ease agent are analysed for more than one purpose or
for other disease agents, either in parallel or at a later
stage’. For the surveillance deﬁnitions and characteris-
tics used in the questionnaire, data collectors were
referred to the ﬁnal report from the International
Conference on Animal Health Surveillance (ICAHS)
in May 2011 [4].
Data collection
The questionnaire was circulated within the
RISKSUR Consortium to collate feedback. Twenty-
nine staff from RISKSUR partner countries collected
the data in their own country and in collaboration
with the assigned contact person in non-partner coun-
tries. All but one data collector were either trained
veterinarians (n= 24) or animal scientists (n= 5).
One external data collector who was temporarily
employed in one non-partner country to ensure that
language did not present a barrier was not working
in the veterinary ﬁeld. A training session was held
with data collectors via Skype to review the protocol
and thus standardize data collection. After approval
by the RVC ethics committee (No. 2013 0071H:
Ethical clearance for RISKSUR mapping), a database
was developed in Microsoft Access (Microsoft Corp.,
USA) and distributed among data collectors.
Information on surveillance components was predom-
inantly collected through a grey literature search,
including government or non-government reports,
national legislations and other information, while
scientiﬁc literature only sometimes provided indica-
tions of surveillance efforts. Representatives from
public and private institutions were contacted to verify
or complement information [31]. Finally, data were
re-entered into a shared web-based SQL database.
Data management
Seven researchers from six institutes (APHA, CIRAD,
FLI, RVC, SVA, UCM) spent 2months on consistency
checks of a subset of the database [34], which included
discussions on standardized use of terminology and
application to recorded components. A terminology
working group was initiated to verify conclusions
regarding means of data acquisition and surveillance
purpose and objective [32]. Based on the results of this
working group, the term ‘surveillance objective’ will
be used instead of ‘surveillance purpose’ throughout
the text. Prior to preparing this manuscript, a ﬁnal con-
sistency check was performed by a single investigator.
This involved checking categorizations once again of
those key variables, for which strong inconsistencies
were identiﬁed during the initial consistency checks
(i.e. surveillance objective, means of data acquisition,
and risk-based sampling) and veriﬁcation that compo-
nents were consistently split according to the following
criteria: (1) individual hazard(s) unless for unspeciﬁc
components (e.g.meat inspection); (2) speciﬁed popula-
tion: species and if applicable target sector; (3) data
source: sampling point, case deﬁnition; (4) risk-based
sampling; and (5) data collection method (means of
data acquisition, study design).
Data analysis
Data were analysed in Stata statistical software release
14 (StataCorp LP, USA). A stacked bar chart of the
number of components stratiﬁed by the sector man-
aging the component (public, private, both, unknown)
was created. Countries with obvious deﬁciencies in
data completeness were excluded from subsequent
analyses. Surveillance component was chosen as the
level of analysis. The percentage and 95% conﬁdence
intervals of components (number of recorded compo-
nents/total number of recorded components) were cal-
culated for each variable using the cii command.
Associations between each variable with the independ-
ent variables management, species and objective were
explored using r× c contingency tables. Cells with low
frequencies were collapsed or discarded if considered
appropriate.The conditional probabilities (columnper-
centages; tabulate command) and adjusted residuals
(tabchi command) were reported. Any cell with adjusted
residuals greater than ±1·96 was highlighted in bold, as
theyaremore extreme thanwould be expected if the null
hypothesis of independence was true [33].
Completeness of surveillance components per coun-
try was estimated by matching the components
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recorded by each country with all obligatory EU com-
ponents identiﬁed in the dataset (see Supplementary
Table S2) and dividing the achieved number by the
total. An EU component was considered obligatory
if it was compulsory for any EU Member State, not
just relating to restriction zones or countries with
eradication programmes in place.
RESULTS
Descriptive results
The dataset prior to the ﬁnal consistency check included
738 active AHS components. Seventy-three compo-
nentswere excluded as theywere combinedwith another
component (n= 42), failed to meet the surveillance
deﬁnition (n= 10), included insufﬁcient information (n
= 8), related to export/import (n= 8), or were duplicates
or considered erroneous (n= 5). Twenty-two compo-
nents were added as recorded variables justiﬁed splitting
the original component to achieve consistency in com-
ponent splitting with other countries. Hence, the ﬁnal
dataset included 687 components.
The number of active AHS components recorded
per country (median 57·5, range 10–105) stratiﬁed
by the sector responsible for management (public, pri-
vate or both) is shown in Supplementary Figure S1. In
most countries, components were predominantly man-
aged publicly [median across countries 65·6%, inter-
quartile range (IQR) 47·5–75·7] with a smaller
percentage being managed privately (median 19·8%,
IQR 9·3–25·6) or in a public–private partnership
(median 7·9%, IQR 3·9–10·8).
Countries 5 (n= 13) and 11 (n= 10) were excluded
from subsequent analyses as their data were consid-
ered to be too incomplete, thus resulting in 664 com-
ponents in the ﬁnal dataset. The remaining countries
reported 34·1–90·2% of the 43 obligatory EU compo-
nents identiﬁed in the dataset (median 59·8%, IQR
48·2–84·1) (see Supplementary Table S2).
Components targeted 55 speciﬁc hazards (592 com-
ponents), 21 hazard groups (e.g. wildlife diseases, emer-
ging diseases) (n= 62) and three indicators (genetic,
health, welfare) (n= 10). Supplementary Table S3
shows the number of components per hazard, the num-
berof countries reportingat least one component for this
hazard, and themedian, minimum andmaximum num-
ber of components for those latter countries. The most
frequent hazards targeted by the hazard-speciﬁc compo-
nents were Salmonella spp. (16·1%), Brucella spp.
(7·7%), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (4·4%), classical
swine fever virus (3·9%), bluetongue disease virus
(3·8%), avian inﬂuenza virus, scrapie and Trichinella
spp. (3·6% each), andAujeszky’s disease virus and enzo-
otic bovine leucosis virus (3·3% each).
Descriptive results for all study countries and stra-
tiﬁed by partner and non-partner countries are pre-
sented in Table 1. Categories of three variables
signiﬁcantly differed between partner and non-partner
countries, i.e. legal requirement, management and
risk-based sampling.
Cattle were the most frequent species targeted by
components (26·7%), followed by pigs (17·5%), poultry
(16·0%), and small ruminants (11·9%). Country 9 did
not record any wildlife components and countries 1
and 7 only one general wildlife component. The cat-
egory ‘other species’ covered ﬁsh (13 components),
insect vectors (n= 9), and bees (n= 3). Fewer than ﬁve
components were recorded for molluscs, shellﬁsh or
crustaceans (n= 4), animal feed (n= 4), and pets (n=
1). Most components were implemented at the national
level (89·4%) and were based on EU regulations
(68·4%). Twelve percent of components were based on
additional national requirements.
The most commonly assigned surveillance objective
was demonstrating freedom from disease (43·8%), fol-
lowed by case detection (26·8%), prevalence estima-
tion (19·7%), and early detection (9·8%). The
sampling point was recorded as farm, abattoir, and
insemination centre for 48·6%, 21·4%, and 15·6% of
components, respectively. Data were usually recorded
to be collected continuously (56·8%) or via repeated
(usually annual) surveys (39·2%). Case reports
(n = 15), sentinel surveillance (n= 8), participatory
surveillance (n= 2), and event-based surveillance
(n = 1) were recorded under ‘other study designs’.
Laboratory diagnosis (direct, indirect or both) was
the most common case deﬁnition. Active clinical surveil-
lance (n= 12), i.e. routine inspection by the competent
authority without prior notiﬁcation of abnormal signs
by farmers, targeted bluetongue disease, classical swine
fever and emerging diseases in more than one country.
Most ‘other case deﬁnitions’ contained multiple case
deﬁnitions including others than laboratory detection
(e.g. indirect indicators, risk factors). Risk-based sam-
pling and multi-hazard surveillance were recorded for
57·1% and 37·3% of components, respectively.
Bivariate results: management
Components managed in a public–private partnership
were more likely recorded (than what would be
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expected if the variables were independent) by partner
(85·3%) than non-partner (14·8%) countries (Table 2).
Privately managed components more frequently tar-
geted cattle (46·6%) and less frequently small ruminants
(8·4%) than public components (34·0% and 21·5%,
respectively). Sixty percent of private components com-
pared to 39·9% of public components aimed to demon-
strate freedom from disease. In contrast, prevalence
estimation and early detection were more frequently
recorded as surveillance objective for public (22·7%
Table 1. Percentage of active surveillance components (number of recorded components/total number of recorded
components) and 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) by surveillance design variables for all ten study countries, stratiﬁed
by whether countries were partners of the EU-FP7 RISKSUR project or not. Components comprised active
surveillance components implemented in 2011. Categories, for which conﬁdence intervals between partner and
non-partner countries did not overlap, are highlighted in grey
Variable (n)* Category All (n= 664) Partner (n= 421) Non-partner (n= 243)
Species (664/421/243) Cattle 26·7 (23·3–30·2) 26·8 (22·7–31·3) 26·3 (20·9–32·3)
Pigs 17·5 (14·7–20·6) 17·8 (14·3–21·8) 16·9 (12·4–22·2)
Poultry 16·0 (13·3–19·0) 14·0 (10·8–17·7) 19·3 (14·6–24·9)
Small ruminants 11·9 (9·5–14·6) 11·9 (8·9–15·4) 11·9 (8·1–16·7)
Wildlife 10·2 (8·0–12·8) 11·4 (8·5–14·8) 8·2 (5·1–12·4)
Equidae 6·9 (5·1–9·1) 7·4 (5·1–10·3) 6·2 (3·5–10·0)
Multi 5·4 (3·8–7·4) 5·0 (3·1–7·5) 6·2 (3·5–10·0)
Other 5·4 (3·8–7·4) 5·7 (3·7–8·4) 4·9 (2·6–8·5)
Management (615/418/197) Public 65·4 (61·5–69·1) 64·4 (59·6–68·9) 67·5 (60·5–74·0)
Private 24·7 (21·4–28·3) 23·2 (19·2–27·6) 27·9 (21·8–34·7)
Both 9·9 (7·7–12·6) 12·4 (9·4–16·0) 4·6 (2·1–8·5)
Area (662/421/241) National 89·4 (86·8–91·7) 87·4 (83·9–90·4) 92·9 (88·9–95·8)
Regional 8·6 (6·6–11·0) 9·7 (7·1–13·0) 6·6 (3·8–10·6)
Local 2·0 (1·0–3·3) 2·9 (1·5–4·9) 0·4 (0–2·3)
Obligation (645/417/228) EU 68·4 (64·6–71·9) 58·5 (53·6–63·3) 86·4 (81·3–90·6)
National 11·6 (9·3–14·4) 12·7 (9·7–16·3) 9·6 (6·1–14·2)
Regional 2·2 (1·2–3·6) 2·6 (1·3–4·7) 1·3 (0·3–3·8)
Private 7·9 (5.9–10.3) 11·8 (8·8–15·2) 0·9 (0·1–3·1)
None 9·9 (7.7–12.5) 14·4 (11·2–18·1) 1·8 (0·5–4·4)
Objective (656/417/239) Disease freedom 43·8 (39.9–47.6) 41·7 (36·9–46·6) 47·3 (40·8–53·8)
Case detection 26·8 (23·5–30·4) 26·9 (22·7–31·4) 26·8 (21·3–32·9)
Prevalence estimation 19·7 (16·7–22·9) 22·5 (18·6–26·9) 14·6 (10·4–19·8)
Early detection 9·8 (7·6–12·3) 8·9 (6·3–12·0) 11·3 (7·6–16·0)
Sampling point (646/405/241) Farm 48·6 (44·7–52·5) 47·2 (42·2–52·2) 51·0 (44·5–57·5)
Abattoir 21·4 (18·3–24·7) 23·0 (19·0–27·4) 18·7 (14·0–24·2)
Insemination 15·6 (12·9–18·7) 14·8 (11·5–18·7) 17·0 (12·5–22·4)
Wild 8·5 (6·5–10·9) 8·4 (5·9–11·5) 8·7 (5·5–13·0)
Rendering 3·7 (2·4–5·5) 4·0 (2·3–6·3) 3·3 (1·4–6·4)
Other 2·2 (1·2–3·6) 2·7 (1·4–4·8) 1·2 (0·3–3·6)
Study type (655/415/240) Continous 56·8 (52·9–60·6) 59·0 (54·1–63·8) 52·9 (46·4–59·4)
Survey 39·2 (35·5–43·1) 35·9 (31·3–40·7) 45·0 (38·6–51·5)
Other 4·0 (2·6–5·8) 5·1 (3·2–7·6) 2·1 (0·7–4·8)
Case deﬁnition (655/417/238) Lab: Pathogen/toxin 42·9 (39·1–46·8) 45·3 (40·5–50·2) 38·7 (32·4–45·2)
Lab: Host response 37·9 (34·1–41·7) 34·8 (30·2–39·6) 43·3 (36·9–49·8)
Both 7·6 (5·7–9·9) 5·5 (3·5–8·2) 11·3 (7·6–16·1)
Clinical/pathological 2·9 (1·8–4·5) 3·8 (2·2–6·2) 1·3 (0·3–3·6)
Other 8·7 (6·7–11·1) 10·6 (7·8–13·9) 5·5 (2·9–9·2)
Risk-based (641/413/228) Yes 57·1 (53·2–61·0) 52·1 (47·1–57·0) 66·2 (59·7–72·3)
No 42·9 (39·0–46·8) 47·9 (43·0–52·9) 33·8 (27·7–40·3)
Multi-hazard (579/396/183) Yes 37·3 (33·4–41·4) 40·4 (35·5–45·4) 30·6 (24·0–37·8)
No 62·7 (58·6–66·6) 59·6 (54·6–64·5) 69·4 (62·2–76·0)
* Number of observations for those categories listed for the respective variable. The difference in observations compared to
the number provided below the heading of 3rd to 5th columns comprises the number of missing observations per category.
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and 11·5%) than for private (8·6% and 3·3%) compo-
nents. Continuous data collection was more commonly
managed publicly (61·2%) than privately (39·5%), while
repeated surveys were more predominant for private
(58·6%) than public (33.6%) components. Risk-based
strategies and multi-hazard surveillance were more
often recorded for privately (66·0% and 68·1%, respect-
ively) than for publicly (53·1% and 28·6%, respectively)
managed components.
Bivariate results: species
Components targeting pigs were more likely based on
additional national regulations (23·0%) than those tar-
geting poultry (6·1%) (Table 3). The objective of dem-
onstrating freedom from disease was more likely
recorded for cattle and pigs (59·1% and 58·6%, respect-
ively) than for poultry (15·1%). Case detection was
more frequently recorded for poultry (65·1%) compared
to the other three species groups, while prevalence esti-
mation was more likely recorded for small ruminants
(35·4%) compared to poultry (8·5%). Farm was more
frequently recorded as sampling point for poultry
(89·1%) than for cattle (46·0%) and pigs (37·2%), while
abattoir was more common for surveillance compo-
nents targeting pigs (38·1%) compared to poultry
(10·9%). Risk-based strategies were relatively seldomly
recorded for pigs (50·4%), while multi-hazard
surveillance was relatively frequently recorded for pigs
(59·0%) and cattle (44·0%). In contrast, multi-hazard
surveillance was relatively uncommon for poultry
(8·1%).
Table 2. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in parentheses)* of management vs. variables for active
surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries (n = 615)
Variable† Category Public Private Both
Partner country (n= 615) Yes 66·9 (−0·77) 63·8 (−1·26) 85·3 (3·05)
No 33·1 (0·77) 36·2 (1·26) 14·8 (−3·05)
Species group (n= 441) Cattle 34·0 (−2·43) 46·6 (2·25) 42·2 (0·53)
Pigs 23·8 (0·39) 22·9 (−0·07) 20·0 (−0·53)
Poultry 20·8 (−0·35) 22·1 (0·27) 22·2 (0·16)
Small ruminants 21·5 (3·09) 8·4 (−3·13) 15·6 (−0·27)
Geographical focus (n= 595) National 89·3 (−3·27) 97·2 (2·70) 96·5 (1·33)
Regional 10·7 (3·27) 2·8 (−2·70) 3·5 (−1·33)
Obligation (n= 610) EU 72·3 (2·85) 65·8 (−0·79) 49·2 (−3·40)
National or regional 16·4 (2·37) 5·9 (−3·29) 18·0 (0·97)
Private or voluntary 11·3 (−5·63) 28·3 (3·95) 32·8 (3·25)
Surveillance objective (n= 608) Disease freedom 39·9 (−3·00) 59·9 (4·48) 32·7 (−1·80)
Case detection 25·9 (−1·05) 28·3 (0·32) 34·6 (1·26)
Prevalence estimation 22·7 (3·00) 8·6 (−3·86) 23·6 (0·87)
Early detection 11·5 (2·68) 3·3 (−2·92) 9·1 (−0·03)
Sampling point (n= 535) Farm 58·0 (1·48) 43·8 (−3·32) 70·0 (2·40)
Abattoir 30·5 (5·27) 8·3 (−4·89) 16·7 (−1·24)
Rendering plant 5·1 (1·52) 0·0 (−2·91) 8·3 (1·75)
Insemination centre 6·3 (−8·58) 47·9 (11·31) 5·0 (−2·69)
Study design (n= 609) Continuous 61·2 (4·42) 39·5 (−4·35) 50·0 (−0·75)
Survey 33·6 (−5·16) 58·6 (5·06) 46·6 (0·90)
Other 5·3 (1·67) 2·0 (−1·62) 3·5 (−0·33)
Case deﬁnition (n= 556) Direct 66·1 (2·77) 37·4 (−3·04) 50·1 (1·01)
Serological 23·2 (−2·64) 54·7 (4·21) 36·3 (−2·15)
Both 7·1 (−0·42) 3·6 (−2·44) 10·8 (2·48)
Clinical/pathological 3·6 (0·15) 4·3 (0·83) 2·8 (−0·85)
Risk-based (n= 600) Yes 53·1 (−2·42) 66·0 (2·66) 56·7 (0·00)
No 46·9 (2·42) 34·0 (−2·66) 43·3 (0·00)
Multi-hazard (n= 548) Yes 28·6 (−6·58) 68·1 (8·15) 31·7 (−1·21)
No 71·4 (6·58) 31·9 (−8·15) 68·3 (1·21)
* Adjusted residuals greater than ±1·96 are highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be expected if the
null hypothesis of independence was true.
† The difference in the number of components compared to the total number indicated in the heading comprises missing or
unknown observations.
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Bivariate results: surveillance objective
The objective prevalence estimation was more fre-
quently recorded by partner (72·9%) than by non-
partner (27·1%) countries (Table 4). Components
were more commonly implemented at the national
level for the objective of demonstrating disease
freedom than for early detection and at the regional
level vice versa. Seventy-six percent of components
with the objective of demonstrating freedom from
disease were regulated by the EU compared to
45·5% of components aimed at early detection.
Components aimed at early detection were more fre-
quently regulated by national regulations or volun-
tary programmes than components with other
objectives. At the farm level, the most frequent objec-
tives were case detection (79·4%) and early detection
(71·7%). The objective of annual surveys at insemin-
ation centres was consistently categorized as demon-
strating freedom from disease (100%). Components
aimed at demonstrating freedom from disease more
commonly applied risk-based sampling (63·3%) and
multi-hazard surveillance (59·5%) compared to
other objectives (risk-based: 44.2–57.9%; multi-haz-
ard: 12.8–35.1%).
Risk-based sampling
The most frequent risk factors were production type
(breeder, grower), age, region, herd size, and time per-
iod (Table 5). Of these top ﬁve risk factors, production
type, age, and herd size predominantly included tar-
geted risk-based strategies, where only a single stra-
tum is under surveillance (e.g. only breeders or only
animals above a certain age). In contrast, for the
risk factor region, the component description mostly
indicated stratiﬁed risk-based sampling, e.g. targeting
regions with different sampling intensity depending on
differences in epidemiological situation or risk of
Table 3. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in parentheses)* of livestock species vs. variables for active
surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries (n = 487)
Variable† Category Cattle Pigs Poultry Small ruminants
Partner country (n= 487) Yes 64·5 (0·75) 64·7 (0·57) 55·7 (−1·63) 63·3 (0·17)
No 35·5 (−0·75) 35·3 (−0·57) 44·3 (1·63) 36·7 (−0·17)
Geographical focus (n= 474) National 92·9 (−0·12) 89·0 (−1·89) 100·0 (3·20) 89·6 (−1·29)
Regional 7·1 (0·12) 11·0 (1·89) 0·0 (−3·20) 10·4 (1·29)
Obligation (n= 472) EU 68·1 (−0·51) 59·3 (−2·70) 86·7 (4·17) 65·8 (−0·78)
National or regional 11·5 (−0·92) 23·0 (3·46) 6·1 (−2·36) 12·7 (−0·20)
Private or voluntary 20·3 (1·45) 17·7 (0·17) 7·1 (−2·96) 21·5 (1·13)
Surveillance objective (n= 487) Disease freedom 59·1 (4·36) 58·6 (2·97) 15·1 (−7·35) 41·8 (−0·94)
Case detection 14·5 (−4·71) 17·2 (−2·59) 65·1 (10·18) 16·5 (−2·21)
Prevalence estimation 21·0 (0·83) 14·7 (−1·39) 8·5 (−3·14) 35·4 (4·04)
Early detection 5·4 (−1·57) 9·5 (0·77) 11·3 (1·53) 6·3 (−0·53)
Sampling point (n= 456) Farm 46·0 (−3·07) 37·2 (−4·40) 89·1 (7·36) 61·3 (1·20)
Abattoir 20·5 (−0·60) 38·1 (4·78) 10·9 (−2·87) 14·7 (−1·66)
Rendering plant 6·3 (1·33) 0·9 (−2·18) 0·0 (−2·36) 12·0 (3·34)
Insemination centre 27·3 (3·87) 23·9 (1·73) 0·0 (−5·10) 12·0 (−1·57)
Study design (n= 481) Continuous 51·6 (−0·55) 55·7 (0·60) 60·4 (1·67) 43·4 (−1·87)
Survey 44·6 (0·24) 41·7 (−0·53) 37·7 (−1·44) 54·0 (1·93)
Other 3·8 (0·92) 2·6 (−0·22) 1·9 (−0·71) 2·6 (−0·16)
Case deﬁnition (n= 452) Direct 36·0 (−2·20) 24·6 (−4·48) 71·8 (6·75) 44·9 (0·38)
Serological 55·3 (2·30) 60·9 (3·11) 24·3 (−5·49) 46·2 (−0·36)
Both 7·5 (0·67) 10·0 (1·76) 1·9 (−2·11) 5·1 (−0·51)
Clinical/pathological 1·2 (−1·39) 4·6 (1·42) 1·9 (−0·51) 3·9 (0·72)
Risk-based (n= 477) Yes 65·6 (1·23) 50·4 (−2·95) 62·3 (0·05) 71·1 (1·76)
No 34·4 (−1·23) 49·6 (2·95) 37·7 (−0·05) 29·0 (−1·76)
Multi-hazard (n= 426) Yes 44·0 (2·61) 59·0 (5·44) 8·1 (−6·64) 25·0 (−2·09)
No 56·0 (−2·61) 41·0 (−5·44) 91·9 (6·64) 75·0 (2·09)
* Adjusted residuals greater than ±1·96 are highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be expected if the
null hypothesis of independence was true.
† The difference in the number of components compared to the total number indicated in the heading comprises missing or
unknown observations.
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introduction. For the risk factor period, both targeted
(e.g. sampling at the end of high risk period to demon-
strate freedom from disease) and stratiﬁed risk-based
approaches (varying sampling intensities between sea-
sons) were reported.
DISCUSSION
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the ﬁrst systematic
analysis of publicly and privately funded AHS compo-
nents in EU Member States and Switzerland.
Generating an overview of all active AHS components
covering the public and private sectors and the full
range of hazards and species was challenging as exist-
ence and design of surveillance components are gener-
ally not systematically documented [31]. Hence, gaps
and opportunities were identiﬁed not just related to
AHS design, but also to the ease and quality of data
collection. This survey showed that the public and pri-
vate sectors applied a range of activities at the
national and regional level in addition to obligatory
EU requirements. Even though data quality did not
allow any in-depth between-country comparisons,
observed patterns across the whole dataset are consid-
ered to provide valuable insights into how AHS was
performed in 2011 in the ten study countries included
in the analysis.
Differences between partner and non-partner countries
Systematic differences may exist between partner and
non-partner countries due to the following reasons:
partner countries were comprised only of EU-12
Member States predominantly situated in Central
and Western Europe, who have a strong interest in
animal health surveillance, which led to their partici-
pation in the RISKSUR project. This selection bias
was aimed to be reduced by also incorporating
EU-15 (CZ) and EU-25 (BG) Member States in the
group of non-partner countries, which, however, also
included three EU-12 Member States (DK, IE, IT)
thus comprising a more heterogeneous group of
Table 4. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in parentheses)* of surveillance objective vs. variables for
active surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries (n = 656)
Variable† Category Case detection Early detection Disease freedom
Prevalence
estimation
Partner country (n= 656) Yes 63·6 (0·02) 57·8 (−1·01) 60·6 (−1·38) 72·9 (2·45)
No 36·4 (−0·02) 42·2 (1·01) 39·4 (1·38) 27·1 (−2·45)
Geographical focus (n= 636) National 91·2 (−0·36) 84·4 (−2·29) 95·7 (3·11) 88·0 (−1·74)
Regional 8·8 (0·36) 15·6 (2·29) 4·3 (−3·11) 12·0 (1·74)
Obligation (n= 636) EU 65·5 (−0·96) 45·5 (−3·83) 76·4 (3·86) 64·6 (−1·04)
National or regional 13·2 (−0·21) 23·6 (2·25) 11·4 (−1·47) 15·0 (0·47)
Private or voluntary 21·3 (1·35) 30·9 (2·63) 12·1 (−3·37) 20·5 (0·84)
Sampling point (n= 574) Farm 79·4 (7·28) 71·7 (2·37) 40·4 (−6·31) 46·9 (−1·94)
Abattoir 19·4 (−1·40) 23·9 (0·10) 19·2 (−2·09) 38·1 (4·12)
Rendering plant 1·3 (−2·18) 4·4 (0·06) 1·2 (−3·22) 15·0 (6·44)
Insemination centre 0·0 (−6·84) 0·0 (−3·25) 39·2 (12·31) 0·0 (−5·45)
Study design (n= 649) Continuous 69·9 (4·01) 73·4 (2·80) 36·3 (−9·42) 77·3 (5·19)
Survey 28·3 (−3·36) 0·0 (−6·74) 62·7 (10·92) 20·3 (−4·83)
Other 1·7 (−1·78) 26·6 (9·69) 1·1 (−3·38) 2·3 (−1·07)
Case deﬁnition (n= 592) Direct 68·6 (6·36) 24·0 (−3·38) 27·6 (−8·64) 72·8 (6·20)
Serological 24·4 (−5·17) 44·0 (0·32) 60·7 (8·53) 20·2 (−5·23)
Both 4·5 (−1·93) 20·0 (3·22) 10·3 (1·80) 2·6 (−2·38)
Clinical/
pathological
2·6 (−0·53) 12·0 (3·69) 1·5 (−2·21) 4·4 (0·79)
Risk-based (n= 635) Yes 57·9 (0·37) 50·0 (−1·14) 63·3 (2·97) 44·2 (−3·21)
No 42·1 (−0·37) 50·0 (1·14) 36·7 (−2·97) 55·8 (3·21)
Multi-hazard (n= 571) Yes 18·7 (−5·37) 35·1 (−0·22) 59·5 (9·83) 12·8 (−5·95)
No 81·3 (5·37) 64·9 (0·22) 40·5 (−9·83) 87·2 (5·95)
* Adjusted residuals greater than ±1·96 are highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be expected if the
null hypothesis of independence was true.
† The difference in the number of components compared to the total number indicated in the heading comprises missing or
unknown observations.
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Central, Southern and Southeastern European coun-
tries. Furthermore, potential differences in the efforts
of collecting the data, data accessibility and availabil-
ity of contacts may have occurred given that partner
countries may have had better contacts to relevant
institutions and a stronger interest in data collection
given their participation in the project consortium.
Acknowledging these potential differences between
partner and non-partner countries, we stratiﬁed
descriptive results and tested for the effect of partner
country (yes/no) as part of the bivariate analyses.
Descriptive results indicated signiﬁcant differences
between partner and non-partner countries for the
variables management (category ‘both’), legal obliga-
tion (EU, private and none) and risk-based sampling
(yes/no). The differences in management and legal
obligation may indicate stronger investment of partner
countries in non-EU regulated privately managed sur-
veillance activities compared to non-partner countries.
Another explanation may be that private and volun-
tary components were better captured in partner
than non-partner countries given that data collection
was highly challenging, so that a variety of informa-
tion sources had to be screened and over 20 contacts
were approached in some countries as part of data col-
lection [34]. The difference in the percentage of risk-
based components was not as pronounced as for the
variables legal obligation and management. Avian
inﬂuenza virus and Aujeszky’s disease virus were the
only hazards for which the total number of compo-
nents justiﬁed a comparison at the hazard level
between partner and non-partner countries. For
avian inﬂuenza, the difference was driven by one non-
partner country recording eight surveillance
Table 5. Percentage of risk-based sampling components (n = 366) stratiﬁed by risk factor (95% conﬁdence
interval). Multiple selections of risk factors per components were allowed. The risk-based components were a subset
of active surveillance components (n = 664) recorded by 10 study countries for the year 2011
Risk factor
Percentage of
components (95% CI) Main type
Comments (remaining components either
other type or unknown)
Production type 45·1% (39·9–50.3) Targeted 142/165: Only breeding animals; 96/142:
Surveillance in artiﬁcial insemination
centres
Age 24·3% (20.0–29·0) Targeted 36/89: Serological components targeting
only older animals; 37/89: BSE/scrapie
components targeting older animals
only
Region 13·1% (9·8–17·0) Stratiﬁed 27/48: Surveillance intensity depended on
epidemiological situation in the region
Herd size 11·2% (8·2–14·9) Targeted 37/41: Only large sized farms were
targeted
Time period 6·0% (3·8–9·0) Varies Restricted to high-risk period (e.g.
demonstrate freedom at end of high-risk
period) or different sampling intensity
between seasons
Production for human consumption 3·6% (1·9–6·0) Targeted
Farm factors 3·8% (2·1–6·3) Varies 5/13: Targeting only outdoor farms
Species 2·5% (1·1–4·6) Varies Since components were generally split by
species, this risk factor was
predominantly recorded for avian
inﬂuenza (distinction between wild bird
and waterfowl species)
Event 2·2% (0.9–4·3) Targeted Testing prior to transport
Disease status of the herd 2·2% (0.9–4·3) Targeted E.g. certiﬁed free herds vs. non-free herds
Trade 1·1% (0.3–2·8) Varies Trade volume (e.g. out-degree
movements)
Previous 2·2% (0.9–4·3) Stratiﬁed Previous irregularities or positive ﬁndings
Various 0.8% (0.2–2·4) n.a.
Unknown 1·9% (0.8–3·9) n.a.
n.a., Not applicable.
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components, all of which were risk-based as opposed
to one to four components recorded by other coun-
tries, some of which were risk-based, while others
were not. For Aujeszky’s disease virus, wildlife com-
ponents were only recorded in partner countries (n=
2), none of which were risk-based, and abattoir sur-
veillance was recorded as risk-based in both non-
partner countries but only in one out of four partner
countries recording this component. Therefore, we
conclude that the difference can be considered as
spurious given that the percentages are to some degree
affected by the number of recorded components.
Bivariate results indicated a signiﬁcant effect of
partner versus non-partner countries for the variables
management (category ‘both’) and objective (category
‘prevalence estimation’), but not for the four com-
pared livestock species groups. For the variable man-
agement, the same arguments apply as discussed
above. The higher number of components aimed at
prevalence estimation may indicate that partner coun-
tries invest relatively more to assess changes in the
hazard situation (e.g. antimicrobial resistance).
Surveillance objective and means of data collection
For active surveillance components, demonstrating
freedom from disease was the most common objective,
while early detection was least common. These objec-
tives are in fact closely linked as activities to demon-
strate freedom from disease are generally based on
annual surveys, after which early detection is needed
to maintain conﬁdence in freedom until the next sur-
vey. Early detection activities were underrepresented
in the data as passive surveillance components were
excluded a priori given that they were considered
too similar between countries. However, for many
hazards passive surveillance is the predominant early
detection component as it is continuously performed
on a daily basis across the entire domestic (and wild-
life) animal population. Furthermore, it can be highly
cost-effective as testing is only performed if disease is
suspected. For example Welby et al. [35] estimated
detection probability (component sensitivity; CSe)
and cost-effectiveness (CSe/cost in €1000) for three
surveillance components targeting bluetongue virus
serotype 8 in Belgium and The Netherlands. Based
on a within-herd prevalence of 20% and the assump-
tion that disease awareness is high, passive surveil-
lance resulted in the highest probability of detection
(CSe = 0·99) compared to active cross-sectional sur-
veys (CSe: 0·73–0·75) and sentinel surveillance
(CSe: 0·29–0·33) and a cost-efﬁciency ratio of 1·38
compared to 0·52 (survey) and 0·41 (sentinel).
However, sensitivity of passive surveillance is
inﬂuenced by the clinical effects of disease, rate of
transmission, population structure (e.g. herd size, pro-
duction system), disease awareness of animal owners
and veterinarians, and their preparedness to report
[35, 36]. Therefore, it is important to also evaluate
the sensitivity of passive surveillance [36], compare
strategies to enhance disease awareness (e.g. awareness
campaigns, training, adequacy of compensation) and
reporting, and assess the acceptability by key stake-
holders [37–39]. Effective dissemination of surveil-
lance results to farmers and the public can also
enhance engagement of these stakeholders and
improve participation.
Given these limitations, active surveillance and
syndromic surveillance may effectively enhance early
detection [29]. Syndromic surveillance is also a (near)
real-time surveillance activity aimed at early detec-
tion. Compared to passive surveillance, syndromic
surveillance is less observer-dependent (depending on
data source) and may detect abnormalities (e.g. in ani-
mal performance) before clinical signs occur, thus
potentially resulting in enhanced timeliness. As part
of One Health, syndromic surveillance in animal
populations also provides opportunities for the early
detection of public health risks [40]. Welby et al.
[35] estimated the probability of syndromic surveil-
lance to detect bluetongue disease virus serotype 8
in the Netherlands as 0·98 and 0·99 for milk produc-
tion data assuming a within-herd prevalence of 2%
and 20%, respectively. Despite the high effectiveness
that can be achieved via syndromic surveillance, its
application requires access to data sources that are
sensitive to changes in the level of disease in the popu-
lation [40] and efﬁcient algorithms that can detect
potential outbreak signals [41]. The current study
identiﬁed 19 syndromic surveillance components
recorded by four of the ten study countries. Ten of
these components targeted multiple diseases, e.g.
emerging diseases (n= 9) or many diseases (n= 1),
whereas the remaining components were hazard-
speciﬁc (n= 5) or targeted disease syndromes, i.e.
mastitis or metabolic disorders (n= 4). Diagnostic
material and pathology examinations were mentioned
as predominant data sources (n= 9). Furthermore,
production data (n= 5), information from practi-
tioners (n = 1) and information sources of govern-
ment, public and charity organizations (n= 1) were
recorded, while the remaining three components
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included insufﬁcient information on the data source.
These data suggest that syndromic surveillance is
not being fully utilized by all countries yet, which is
also in line with Dorea et al. [40].
Risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance
For active components aimed at early detection, com-
prehensive coverage is generally not cost-effective as
disease needs to be detected at very low prevalence
to fulﬁl the aim of early detection [42]. Therefore, risk-
based and alternative approaches (e.g. syndromic sur-
veillance) are important to consider to enhance the
likelihood of (early) detection. Efforts to demonstrate
freedom from disease and detect cases also beneﬁt
from risk-based approaches, especially risk-based
sampling and risk-based requirement (i.e. incorpor-
ation of historical data) [10, 43], as the aim is to detect
disease rather than providing representative estimates
such as for prevalence estimation. The current data
indicate that 50.0%, 63.3%, and 57·9% of components
with the objectives early detection, demonstrating
freedom from disease, and case detection, respectively,
included risk-based approaches. Risk-based strategies
and multi-hazard surveillance were more commonly
recorded for the private sector compared to the public
sector. Since two thirds of private components were
based on EU regulations, this may only be partly
explained by less stringent legal requirements.
Differences between countries in the extent compo-
nents are managed publicly or privately may contrib-
ute to the higher likelihood of risk-based approaches
in the private sector with some countries being more
progressive than others. But the private sector may
also be under higher pressure to demonstrate cost-
effectiveness, which is supported by the fact that the
private sector more commonly focussed on aspects
with higher economic importance (e.g. cattle and
pigs, demonstrating disease freedom to ensure trade).
Based on these ﬁndings it is hypothesized that risk-
based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance could
be incorporated more strongly as part of public ani-
mal health surveillance.
Albeit risk-based sampling was recorded for more
than half of components, most of these risk-based
components were targeted, only focussing on one
population stratum instead of adjusting surveillance
intensity according to the risk level of different strata.
While it may be justiﬁed in some cases to only focus
on a single stratum (e.g. serological surveillance in
older animals), no statement can be made on the
population strata not included. Therefore targeted
risk-based sampling as recorded for most of the risk-
based components is in fact similar to conventional
designs, just being focussed on a single population
stratum. Stratiﬁed risk-based sampling in contrast dis-
tinguishes between high- and low-risk strata of the
population. Since all animals have a nonzero prob-
ability of being selected, probabilistic statements can
still be made for the entire population, but surveil-
lance sensitivity can be increased given a constant
sample size or sample size can be reduced at constant
target sensitivity. Furthermore, stratiﬁed risk-based
sampling allows maintaining low level surveillance in
low-risk strata to help retain awareness and provide
incentives to comply with regulations, e.g. the with-
drawal period for antibiotics [27].
Movement data provide opportunities to distinguish
between farms having a high risk of introduction or
spread based on the frequency of in- and out-degree
movements and the number and characteristics of trad-
ing partners. However, animal movements were only
recorded as a risk criterion by two countries (four com-
ponents), one of which only targeted high turnover
premises (i.e. targeted risk-based). Hence, opportunities
exist to enhance utilization of quantitative (e.g. move-
ment data), but also qualitative data (e.g. biosecurity
level) to distinguish between risk levels of different
population strata. The data provided little evidence of
the application of alternative approaches such as par-
ticipatory [44] or event-based surveillance [45].
Legal requirements
Many EU and national legislations still prescribe what
has to be done (input-based) rather than what has to
be achieved (output-based) and generally focus on a sin-
gle pathogen. Such input-based requirements do not
provide much stimulus to evaluate alternative surveil-
lance designs in order to identify the most cost-effective
approach for the speciﬁc population to be targeted.
Even though input-based standards are simple to com-
pare between countries, they may result in low sensitiv-
ity in some population strata and excessive sample
numbers in others [9]. EU countries vary considerably
in their population structure, trading patterns, hazard
situation, and risk factors. Output-based standards
allow tailoring surveillance to the population of interest.
However, epidemiologically sound application of
output-based standards requires epidemiological expert-
ise, knowledge regarding the target population, good
data quality, and transparency. Interestingly, more
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recent regulations (e.g. 2006/88/EC for aquatic animals,
2007/268/EC for avian inﬂuenza virus, 1266/2007 for
bluetongue disease virus – see Supplementary Table S2)
encourage application of risk-based approaches and
multi-hazard surveillance, indicating that the propaga-
tion of these alternative strategies in literature has
informed legal requirements. Also, the new EU
Animal Health Law explicitly emphasizes the need to
take into account the epidemiology of disease, risk fac-
tors and characteristics of the target population
(Article 27) and allows application of alternative strat-
egies such as accounting for historical data to maintain
disease free status [Article 36(1d)]. Hence, the new EU
Animal Health Law provides enhanced opportunities
to apply alternative surveillance approaches to increase
effectiveness and cost-efﬁciency of surveillance.
Importance of hazards
Economic importance and zoonotic potential (7/10 of
the most frequent hazards have zoonotic potential)
appear to be important drivers for surveillance. As a
result, species with little economic value such as pets
and wildlife were less frequently covered, which pre-
sents another gap in surveillance. For zoonotic dis-
eases, many alternative approaches have been
promoted under the concept of One Health including
systems thinking, participatory approaches and prior-
ity setting [46–49], which can only be achieved via
effective collaboration between sectors (public-
private) and disciplines (animal-public health).
Transparent documentation of surveillance compo-
nents and formal assessments of the entire surveillance
system for a given hazard may also provide opportun-
ities to inform or beneﬁt from these approaches and
thus possibly enhance convergence between human
and veterinary health agencies. Such One Health
approaches are increasingly promoted and present
true opportunities to advance the effectiveness of zoo-
notic disease surveillance, early preparedness and pro-
tection of human and animal health in the EU.
Sources of bias
Selection bias might have occurred by including all
partner countries and selecting ﬁve non-partner coun-
tries. However, a systematic and transparent selection
process with clearly speciﬁed criteria was applied in an
effort to minimize selection bias. Due to time and
resource constraints, data collection could not be
expanded to all EU Member States.
Furthermore, informationbiasmayhave occurred due
to differences between countries in the availability of
information and effortsmade to seek additional informa-
tion, centralisation of efforts, and willingness of contacts
to share information. The efforts required collecting
information on existing public and private surveillance
activities covering all hazards and animal species
exceeded expectations by far. Therefore, various grey lit-
erature sources had to be screened and contact persons
approached to gather information on the full range of
activities. Many countries have no centralised system
capturing at least the existence and design of surveillance
activities. Furthermore, surveillance documentation was
moredifﬁcult toobtain for the private than thepublic sec-
tor. In a post-hoc questionnaire, data collectors ranked
statements that (a) the existence and (b) the design of sur-
veillance was adequately documented in their country,
resulting in a median rank of 4 and 3 out of 5 (range
2–5) for public and 2 for both out of 5 (range 1–4) for pri-
vate components [34].Data collection also indicated con-
siderable differences between countries regarding
evaluation and dissemination of surveillance efforts as
well as collaborations between the public and private sec-
tor. Furthermore, while some countries have a strongly
centralized system (e.g. NL, SE,UK), others are strongly
decentralized (e.g. DE, ES, FR). Regional variability is
more pronounced in decentralized countries, which is
difﬁcult to capture. Last, some countries were concerned
about conﬁdentiality, so that participation was only
agreed on if data were presented in aggregated form
and countries were anonymized. These challenges were
reﬂected by a wide range in the number of reported com-
ponents and percentage of obligatory EU components
covered in the countries’ datasets. This latter percentage
is underestimated as it is sometimes affected by the way
components were split (i.e. a country merging compo-
nents not merged by other countries). However, com-
pleteness has affected data quality in some countries, so
that results have to be interpreted with care and no
between-country comparisons were attempted.
Another major limitation related to differences in
applying terminology to speciﬁc components, which led
to initial high variability in how variables were categor-
ized between countries. As a result, extensive consistency
checkswere carriedout anda terminologyworkinggroup
established to improve the comparability of data. These
inconsistencies in applying terminology and general
inconsistencies between data collected, as shown in this
study, could therefore be used as a basis to argue for a
standardized documentation of the design of surveillance
activities within the EU. Documentation guidelines or
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standard forms have for example been developed by
EFSA for surveillance of Echinococcus multilocularis
[50] and by the EU reference laboratory for surveillance
of ﬁsh diseases (http://www.eurl-ﬁsh.eu/Activities/
survey_and_diagnosis.aspx). But no standard require-
ments have been agreed on, which provide sufﬁcient
information to create an informed overview, but sufﬁ-
cient ﬂexibility to accommodate different approaches
and preserve the necessary degree of conﬁdentiality.
Recommendations regarding surveillance design
It is difﬁcult to make general recommendations
regarding surveillance design as it depends on many
factors such as the hazard and population under sur-
veillance, the hazard situation and objective. When
judging surveillance design, it is important to consider
the surveillance system as a whole including its passive
and active components as components may comple-
ment each other. This systems approach allows (a)
identiﬁcation of surveillance gaps (i.e. sectors or age
groups not covered) and components with sub-
optimal effectiveness and (b) assessment of opportun-
ities to increase effectiveness and economic efﬁciency.
The effectiveness of surveillance approaches can only
be optimized if various surveillance designs are formally
compared as demonstrated manifold in published litera-
ture over recent years. This may include comparisons of
different testing regimens, sampling points and risk strata,
strategies to enhanceawareness or incorporationofhistor-
ical data. Hence, systematic documentation of current
designs, evaluation and comparisons with alternative
strategies provide opportunities to select more effective
andefﬁcient surveillanceapproaches.However, improved
transparency and documentation of design detailsmay be
needed to allow application of more ﬂexible approaches.
Recommendations derived from the process of
collecting the data
If registration of surveillance activities at country level
was centralized, this would provide an overview and
allow for better coordination of efforts to be made
between the public and private sector. Furthermore,
a minimum set of design variables could be deﬁned
in advance in order to achieve consistency in docu-
mentation. This could be achieved through the use
of the surveillance design framework developed by
the RISKSUR project, which provides a tool that
can be used for standardized documentation of sur-
veillance efforts (http://webtools.fp7-risksur.eu/).
Moreover, despite a common source of deﬁnitions,
terminology may lead to differences in interpretations
when applied to speciﬁc components, as shown by this
study. Therefore, illustrating the correct application of
terminology based on speciﬁc components may be
useful to supplement deﬁnitions and thus achieve better
consistency (http://www.fp7-risksur.eu/terminology).
Given that surveillance can be perceived to be a
sensitive topic, it is also important to clearly explain
to contributing parties the purpose and expected
outcome of more transparent documentation.
Conﬁdentiality concerns may limit the application of
alternative strategies, as these require transparent
documentation to assess the adequacy of assumptions
and design speciﬁcations. However, these limitations
stand in contrast to the claim that surveillance is a
public good [51]. Hence, there is a joint responsibility
to address factors limiting transparent documentation
of surveillance activities.
All these aspects do not just pertain to this study but
may cause problems with any compilation of surveil-
lance activities across EU Member States (e.g. EFSA
reports, EU summary reports). Hence, these gaps hin-
der information sharing in general and limit the ability
to integrate information from various sources (e.g.
active/passive, public/private, different species) in a
meaningful manner. It is hypothesized that increased
transparency would beneﬁt all parties by enhancing
trust, facilitating meaningful comparisons, and allow-
ing more targeted complementation of activities
based on the evaluation of the entire surveillance sys-
tem rather than its individual components in isolation.
CONCLUSIONS
The study identiﬁed several gaps (lack of systematic
documentation, inconsistent application of termin-
ology, little evidence of surveillance in species with
low economic importance) and opportunities (e.g. bet-
ter uptake of alternative methods, increased use of
stratiﬁed risk-based sampling, application of novel
approaches promoted as part of One Health). The
greater ﬂexibility provided by the new EU Animal
Health Law means that systematic evaluation of sur-
veillance alternatives will be required to ensure that
surveillance is as efﬁcient and effective as possible [52].
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